After a good deal of deliberation, I've decided to do away with Weyenberg Weekly. My summer project has evolved to something more sustainable, and overall, it has more potential than this blog does. What I've written here is some of my best stuff, and it's been replicated in some ways on the new project as well.
So, if you like what you see here, check out my summer project, and then check out the new 105 project here.
Thanks for reading!
-jw
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Friday, July 16, 2010
Thursday, May 27, 2010
Kill the Filibuster: Locke on Majority
When most people think of Locke, they think of property. However, the protection of private property is not the end-all-be-all of Locke. While the end of Locke’s government is indeed the preservation of property, the end of his legislature is more general: the preservation of society. So, obviously, how the legislature works is of the utmost importance to Locke, and it works under the direction of majority rule precisely because society is ruled by the majority. Locke says “it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it; and so everyone is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority." Majority rule is a condition of Locke’s social contract; it is ingrained into the very fiber of the state. For Locke, politics necessarily presupposes majority rule. Essentially, politics is simply is not possible without this institution. “The act of the majority passes for the act of the whole,” says Locke. An important distinction here is that Locke means that the act of the majority is to be perceived as the act of the whole, not taken to actually be the act of the whole. This allows for an importance to still be placed on dissenting opinion and minority rights.
Locke extrapolates the importance of majority rule in the origin of society into his legislature. The legislature, for Locke, is the director of the force of the commonwealth. It is “bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject." In short, the legislature is the greatest power in the state. However, the legislature needs the consent of society to act. They obtain this through election, and therefore their power is limited to advancing the public good. In this sense, Locke and Rousseau’s legislatures have similar limitations (it is also worth noting that for both authors, the ultimate end of government in general is the preservation of liberty). However, Locke’s legislature operates on majority rule because they are elected representatives; their will is taken as the will of the people, and the majority of the people have the right of decision making in political society, so the majority of the legislature is therefore the ruling body. If majority rule does not rule the legislature, than politics is as impossible to advance as it is when majority rule does not rule society.
This can easily be seen in the history of American politics. Even recently, the mere threat of a filibuster is enough to convince the majority to drop a major piece of legislation. This necessity of a super-majority stifles progress in all areas of national policy, and, as Locke says, the body often fails to move at all because the will of the majority is held hostage by the will of the minority. Yes, it is entirely possible that the will of the majority may not be perpetually correct, but halting politics altogether to mitigate this risk is not the answer. Focusing on finding the general will may be a noble calling, but it is in no way practical. With the general will as the focus, politics will stagnate, and may cease to exist altogether as Locke notes when he says “where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again." There are dangers in all aspects of politics, but two things are certain: politics must constantly be advancing and adapting, and majority rule is the only way to ensure that this occurs in the best way possible, that is, occurs in the best interest of the most people of a society.
Locke extrapolates the importance of majority rule in the origin of society into his legislature. The legislature, for Locke, is the director of the force of the commonwealth. It is “bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject." In short, the legislature is the greatest power in the state. However, the legislature needs the consent of society to act. They obtain this through election, and therefore their power is limited to advancing the public good. In this sense, Locke and Rousseau’s legislatures have similar limitations (it is also worth noting that for both authors, the ultimate end of government in general is the preservation of liberty). However, Locke’s legislature operates on majority rule because they are elected representatives; their will is taken as the will of the people, and the majority of the people have the right of decision making in political society, so the majority of the legislature is therefore the ruling body. If majority rule does not rule the legislature, than politics is as impossible to advance as it is when majority rule does not rule society.
This can easily be seen in the history of American politics. Even recently, the mere threat of a filibuster is enough to convince the majority to drop a major piece of legislation. This necessity of a super-majority stifles progress in all areas of national policy, and, as Locke says, the body often fails to move at all because the will of the majority is held hostage by the will of the minority. Yes, it is entirely possible that the will of the majority may not be perpetually correct, but halting politics altogether to mitigate this risk is not the answer. Focusing on finding the general will may be a noble calling, but it is in no way practical. With the general will as the focus, politics will stagnate, and may cease to exist altogether as Locke notes when he says “where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again." There are dangers in all aspects of politics, but two things are certain: politics must constantly be advancing and adapting, and majority rule is the only way to ensure that this occurs in the best way possible, that is, occurs in the best interest of the most people of a society.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
Kill the Filibuster: Rousseau's General Will
Majority rule is almost axiomatic of democracy, especially as it relates to the legislature. That fifty percent plus one constitutes majority and that this majority will inevitably act in the best interest of society has been accepted as truth for millennia. It can be seen in nearly every legislature all the way to student governments to children deciding on which game to play on a Saturday afternoon; the idea has pervaded itself into Western culture in a way that no other rule of government has. Why, then, is this not adequate for the United States Senate? To answer this question from a theoretical perspective, we need to find an argument against pure majority rule. One the best examples of this is Rousseau’s idea of the general will.
It should first be recognized that, contrary to many other authors, Rousseau sees majority rule only as an established convention and not as natural. This stance allows him to challenge majority rule in ways that many other authors cannot. He does this by positing the idea that the general will is sovereign in a state. Of the general will, Rousseau says it “is always right and always tends toward the public utility”. This idea of infallibility echoes early ideas of majority rule from authors such as Aristotle, and it was so sought after that Post-Revolutionary France tried in many ways to ensure legislation was in line with this general will. It is important to recognize that the general will is not the same as the will of all, because Rousseau says that the will of all is easily tricked and manipulated. He says that “what makes the will general is not so much the number of votes as the common interest that unites them”. Overall, it could be argued that the general will is the will that seeks to most advance the public good. This can be seen when Rousseau says “the art of the legislator is to know how to determine the point at which the government’s will and force…are combined in the relationship that is most advantageous to the state”. He also says that “in a perfect act of legislation, the private or individual will should be nonexistent, the corporate will proper to the government should be very subordinate, and consequently the general or sovereign will should always be dominant”. So for Rousseau, the legislature is responsible for interpreting the general will and acting on it.
But how is the general will to be interpreted? After all, it is possible that it is held only by one member of the state. It would seem, then, that the legislature is responsible for finding a needle in a haystack. Rousseau does, however, offer a few guidelines. Firstly, the general will can never concern a particular object. In fact, he goes so far as to say that any function relating to a particular object does not belong to the legislature at all. Rousseau also says that the private will is never the same as the general will for any long period of time. Finally, he says that “for the general will to be well articulated, it is therefore important that there should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up his own mind”.
The problem is that these guidelines are entirely too vague to make this rule of the general will a reality. As I alluded to earlier, the French did attempt this, but it was never a success. In essence, Rousseau says that the general will is felt, not seen. By nature, this is extremely difficult, if not completely impossible, to judge objectively. Also, if it is not often in line with the private will or the will of the majority, but is hidden latent in the mind of society, how is it ever supposed to be interpreted? Are legislators supposed to be able to read the minds of citizens? Furthermore, if it can never concern a particular object, this essentially destroys the ability of the legislature to write any prescriptive laws. Take the two major reforms in the United States in the last year: health care and financial reform. They certainly address a particular object, so under rule of the general will they would not even be possible. For that matter, reform in general would be nearly impossible under this type of rule. Finally, Rousseau himself recognizes that society eventually arrives a point where a person is defined as a voter by his associations, which presupposes a partial society in which the general will is poorly articulated.
In sum, Rousseau’s theory of the rule of general will does provide a theoretical basis for majority-subverting rules such as the filibuster, but it is so difficult– and even, at times, impossible – to discern, that it is not sufficient to warrant such a rule. Also, the idea of subverting majority rule is very well dispelled by many of the ideas of John Locke.
It should first be recognized that, contrary to many other authors, Rousseau sees majority rule only as an established convention and not as natural. This stance allows him to challenge majority rule in ways that many other authors cannot. He does this by positing the idea that the general will is sovereign in a state. Of the general will, Rousseau says it “is always right and always tends toward the public utility”. This idea of infallibility echoes early ideas of majority rule from authors such as Aristotle, and it was so sought after that Post-Revolutionary France tried in many ways to ensure legislation was in line with this general will. It is important to recognize that the general will is not the same as the will of all, because Rousseau says that the will of all is easily tricked and manipulated. He says that “what makes the will general is not so much the number of votes as the common interest that unites them”. Overall, it could be argued that the general will is the will that seeks to most advance the public good. This can be seen when Rousseau says “the art of the legislator is to know how to determine the point at which the government’s will and force…are combined in the relationship that is most advantageous to the state”. He also says that “in a perfect act of legislation, the private or individual will should be nonexistent, the corporate will proper to the government should be very subordinate, and consequently the general or sovereign will should always be dominant”. So for Rousseau, the legislature is responsible for interpreting the general will and acting on it.
But how is the general will to be interpreted? After all, it is possible that it is held only by one member of the state. It would seem, then, that the legislature is responsible for finding a needle in a haystack. Rousseau does, however, offer a few guidelines. Firstly, the general will can never concern a particular object. In fact, he goes so far as to say that any function relating to a particular object does not belong to the legislature at all. Rousseau also says that the private will is never the same as the general will for any long period of time. Finally, he says that “for the general will to be well articulated, it is therefore important that there should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up his own mind”.
The problem is that these guidelines are entirely too vague to make this rule of the general will a reality. As I alluded to earlier, the French did attempt this, but it was never a success. In essence, Rousseau says that the general will is felt, not seen. By nature, this is extremely difficult, if not completely impossible, to judge objectively. Also, if it is not often in line with the private will or the will of the majority, but is hidden latent in the mind of society, how is it ever supposed to be interpreted? Are legislators supposed to be able to read the minds of citizens? Furthermore, if it can never concern a particular object, this essentially destroys the ability of the legislature to write any prescriptive laws. Take the two major reforms in the United States in the last year: health care and financial reform. They certainly address a particular object, so under rule of the general will they would not even be possible. For that matter, reform in general would be nearly impossible under this type of rule. Finally, Rousseau himself recognizes that society eventually arrives a point where a person is defined as a voter by his associations, which presupposes a partial society in which the general will is poorly articulated.
In sum, Rousseau’s theory of the rule of general will does provide a theoretical basis for majority-subverting rules such as the filibuster, but it is so difficult– and even, at times, impossible – to discern, that it is not sufficient to warrant such a rule. Also, the idea of subverting majority rule is very well dispelled by many of the ideas of John Locke.
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