Kill the Filibuster: Rousseau's General Will

Majority rule is almost axiomatic of democracy, especially as it relates to the legislature. That fifty percent plus one constitutes majority and that this majority will inevitably act in the best interest of society has been accepted as truth for millennia. It can be seen in nearly every legislature all the way to student governments to children deciding on which game to play on a Saturday afternoon; the idea has pervaded itself into Western culture in a way that no other rule of government has. Why, then, is this not adequate for the United States Senate? To answer this question from a theoretical perspective, we need to find an argument against pure majority rule. One the best examples of this is Rousseau’s idea of the general will.

It should first be recognized that, contrary to many other authors, Rousseau sees majority rule only as an established convention and not as natural. This stance allows him to challenge majority rule in ways that many other authors cannot. He does this by positing the idea that the general will is sovereign in a state. Of the general will, Rousseau says it “is always right and always tends toward the public utility”. This idea of infallibility echoes early ideas of majority rule from authors such as Aristotle, and it was so sought after that Post-Revolutionary France tried in many ways to ensure legislation was in line with this general will. It is important to recognize that the general will is not the same as the will of all, because Rousseau says that the will of all is easily tricked and manipulated. He says that “what makes the will general is not so much the number of votes as the common interest that unites them”. Overall, it could be argued that the general will is the will that seeks to most advance the public good. This can be seen when Rousseau says “the art of the legislator is to know how to determine the point at which the government’s will and force…are combined in the relationship that is most advantageous to the state”. He also says that “in a perfect act of legislation, the private or individual will should be nonexistent, the corporate will proper to the government should be very subordinate, and consequently the general or sovereign will should always be dominant”. So for Rousseau, the legislature is responsible for interpreting the general will and acting on it.

But how is the general will to be interpreted? After all, it is possible that it is held only by one member of the state. It would seem, then, that the legislature is responsible for finding a needle in a haystack. Rousseau does, however, offer a few guidelines. Firstly, the general will can never concern a particular object. In fact, he goes so far as to say that any function relating to a particular object does not belong to the legislature at all. Rousseau also says that the private will is never the same as the general will for any long period of time. Finally, he says that “for the general will to be well articulated, it is therefore important that there should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up his own mind”.

The problem is that these guidelines are entirely too vague to make this rule of the general will a reality. As I alluded to earlier, the French did attempt this, but it was never a success. In essence, Rousseau says that the general will is felt, not seen. By nature, this is extremely difficult, if not completely impossible, to judge objectively. Also, if it is not often in line with the private will or the will of the majority, but is hidden latent in the mind of society, how is it ever supposed to be interpreted? Are legislators supposed to be able to read the minds of citizens? Furthermore, if it can never concern a particular object, this essentially destroys the ability of the legislature to write any prescriptive laws. Take the two major reforms in the United States in the last year: health care and financial reform. They certainly address a particular object, so under rule of the general will they would not even be possible. For that matter, reform in general would be nearly impossible under this type of rule. Finally, Rousseau himself recognizes that society eventually arrives a point where a person is defined as a voter by his associations, which presupposes a partial society in which the general will is poorly articulated.

In sum, Rousseau’s theory of the rule of general will does provide a theoretical basis for majority-subverting rules such as the filibuster, but it is so difficult– and even, at times, impossible – to discern, that it is not sufficient to warrant such a rule. Also, the idea of subverting majority rule is very well dispelled by many of the ideas of John Locke.